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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although globalisation is by no means a recent phenomenon,1 its new wave 
has raised a number of questions—both about its supposed benefits and its alleged 
adverse consequences. Rather than exploring  the wider ramifications of 
globalisation, this paper will confine its purview to the question of technology 
development and dissemination in the context of globalisation as it has affected the 
development of Asian economies in the last few decades. In particular, the paper will 
focus on the somewhat dazzling performance of the East Asian economies in the last 
three decades and their equally sharp and unforeseen downturn in the past two years, 
which has raised serious doubts first about the replicability and later about the 
robustness of the East Asian development experience. Although the palpable cause of 
the current East Asian crisis has generally been situated in  the increasing complexity 
and fragility of the global financial system, many prescient international economists 
had attributed it to the weakness of the technological underpinnings of East Asian 
growth [Krugman (1994)]. The East Asian crisis has also raised a lively controversy 
concerning the impact and desirability of selective micro-economic interventions by 
national governments, which have often been oversimplified under the rubric of 
‘crony capitalism’. While the debate on which causes contributed most to the sudden 
down-turn in the growth of the East Asian economies remains inconclusive, there 
seems considerable validity in the conjecture that their future growth prospects will 
depend on their ability not only to master current technologies, but also to 
significantly  further their technological prowess through R and D and scientific 
achievement. Although the immediate trigger of the present crisis in East Asia may 
have been the turmoil in their financial markets, the underlying problems in the real 
economy, which have so far received insufficient attention, stem largely from their 
incommensurate technological development. 
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1For a historical review, see Nayyar (1996). 
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Technological factors which played second fiddle to capital accumulation in 
economists’ explanation of economic growth in the past, have increasingly taken a 
centre stage, especially in the analysis of long-term growth trends [Martin and Pavitt 
(1993) and OECD (1992)]. Globalisation itself owes both its origin and recent 
resurgence in no uncertain way to the spurt of technological innovations which have 
expanded its reach in all possible directions. The late 19th century witnessed, among 
other things, the opening of the Suez Canal, the completion of the Union Pacific 
railroad and the laying down of submarine telegraph cables across the Oceans, 
making it possible to conduct the free flow of goods and services, as well as of 
information, across the globe. The current wave of innovations in electronic 
technology has, of course, multiplied manifolds the speed with which these flows 
now moved globally. Indeed this speed is a rather mixed blessing and has given rise 
to considerable volatility in world capital and foreign exchange markets which was 
partly responsible for the recent East Asian debacle. 
The paper is organised in the following manner. After a preliminary indication 
of the scope of the paper in the present section, the paper discusses the relationship 
between globalisation and economic growth from the perspective of technological 
change. Section III takes stock of growth in the Asian region, concentrating on the 
two major subregions, East Asia and South Asia, which not only constitute the bulk 
of population and income of the region, but also provide an interesting contrast in 
their development experience, including their policies towards technological and 
human development. The fourth section of the paper reviews the role of technology 
in development strategies followed over time and across countries. The fifth section 
focuses on the impact of globalisation on technology development and dissemination. 
The sixth section of the paper discusses the role of technology in explaining the both 
the spectacular rise and the present crisis  of East Asian economies. The concluding 
section tries to draw some lessons from the experience of Asian developing countries 
from technological development in the present era of  globalisation. 
 
II. GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
World merchandise trade has grown by a factor of 16 in real terms since 1950, 
while world real output grew by a factor of 5.5, reflecting the increasing openness of 
economies. And the pace of trade integration appears to be accelerating. During the 
period 1985–1996 the ratio of trade to world GDP rose three times faster than in the 
previous decade. Services trade has been one of the fastest-growing components of 
this trade. Similar trends are observable in foreign direct investment and technology 
transfers. 
However, despite the euphoria about globalisation some of the largest 
economies, like the United States,  still remain largely closed to the outside world.  In 
the  US economy the share of trade—measured as the average of exports and imports 
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of goods and services—in its GDP was less than 5 percent in 1960s and rose to 11.4 
percent in 1994,  implying more than doubling of the ratio. While growth of trade has 
not been quite as dramatic in other developed countries it has also been impressive.  
Thus the trade share of the average OECD countries rose from 12.5 percent in 1960s 
to 18.6 percent in 1990s. Many developing countries, including China, export  25 to 
100 percent of their GDP but it would be  wrong and conceitful to suppose that the 
global economy is a late twentieth century creation. Indeed much of the growth in 
trade since 1960s simply represents a recovery to the levels achieved before 1913 
when the world trade declined substantially as a result of the rise of protectionism 
which accompanied the rise in aggressive nationalism during the inter-war period.  
The pace of globalisation among developing countries, however, has been 
uneven. Just ten countries contributed more than three quarters of the last decade’s 
rise in the overall developing country trade-GDP ratio. Trade ratios fell in some 44 
out of 93 developing countries. The distribution of FDI was also skewed: 8 countries 
comprising 30 percent of developing country GDP garnered two-thirds of FDI in 
1990–93, and half of the countries received inflows of less than 0.2 percent of GDP. 
Although the current resurgence in the international trade and investment does 
not refute the existence of previous eras of globalisation, there are certain inherent 
features of the globalisation process the world is currently experiencing which 
differentiates it from those in  earlier periods. In some ways the evolving world 
economic system is the first to be  genuinely globalise. Markets in different parts of 
the world interact continuously. Modern communications enable them to respond 
instantaneously. Sophisticated credit instruments provide unprecedented liquidity. 
Hedge funds, the trading departments of international banks and institutional 
investors possess the reach, power and resources to profit from market swings in 
either direction, and even to bring them about. 
Four characteristics of the present globalise system have often been 
particularly highlighted. First,  the rise of intra-trade or trade in similar goods 
between similar countries, implying the increasing plurality in the range of goods 
traded between countries both as exports and imports, rather than the existence of a 
mutually exclusive pattern of comparative advantage. Secondly, the ability of 
producers to slice up the value chain, breaking the production process into a number 
of separate stages which enable the possibility of geographical specialisation. 
Another significant feature of the present phase of globalisation is the emergence of 
super exporters, with trade ratios close to 100 percent and large share in international 
trade. Finally, it has given rise to the emergence of large exports of manufactured 
goods from low-wage to high-wage nations and the evolution of a new pattern of 
specialisation between developed and developing countries.  
The rapid rise in post-war international trade has been attributed to a number 
of factors. These include political factors, as well as the emergence of a more 
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interdependent  global economy under the leadership of United States which became 
a standard bearer of free trade, notwithstanding the considerable strength of the 
protectionist lobby in the United States. The conclusion of a number of 
comprehensive rounds of trade liberalisation under GATT has also contributed to the 
opening up of world economies during the inter-war period. In addition there were a 
number of unilateral actions by many developing countries which wished to eschew 
the earlier strategy of import substitution in favour of export promotion to enable 
them to benefit from enlarging the size of the market for their products.  The rise in 
world trade is also a result of the changes in political boundaries, which have created 
new nations and have  served to convert internal commodity movements  into 
international trade flows.   
While technological change has received a significant role in explaining the 
growth of world trade, not all technological development can be considered as trade 
creating. Some observers believe that the major technological innovation facilitating 
trade such as the rail, road, steam ship and the telegraph were already in place before 
the two World Wars and that major technological innovations have not been on the 
same scale of importance in terms of explaining the rise in trade flows [Krugman 
(1995)]. However, others [Cooper and Srinivasan (1995)] have disputed this and 
have pointed out the enormous reduction in costs of ocean transportation, 
particularly, for low value items, such as coal, iron ore and oil in large super tankers, 
bulk carriers, containerships and roll-on-roll-off,  with capacities 15 to 30 times 
larger than  those of pre-World War II ships. Even more significant development has 
been the emergence of long distance jet airliners and wide- body jets which have 
made it possible to ship perishable items such as cut flowers, fruits and vegetables 
across the globe at reasonable transport costs. Cheap air freight also permits the 
international organisation of production- slicing and subcontracting and combines it 
with just-in-time production of goods. It has also facilitated the shipment of samples 
and documents through courier airfreight services. One estimate puts US overseas 
exports shipped by air freight at 40 percent and of its imports at 30 percent [Cooper 
and Srinivasan (1995)].    
The widespread availability of computers and telecommunications has 
facilitated the geographic dispersion of a complex production process which were 
previously very difficult to coordinate. The advent of such innovations  such as long 
range passenger jet, cheap international phone calls, fax machines and electronic mail 
have permitted an intensity of long distance business interactions that were not 
previously possible.  Against these favourable influences of technology on world 
trade some possible negative impacts should also be mentioned.  Such negative 
impacts include the miniaturisation of products resulting in much lower use of raw 
materials per unit value of output and the lower productivity of the non-traded 
service sector which reduces the share of traded goods in GDP. 
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For policy-makers in developing countries, globalisation raises both concerns and 
policy challenges. Global integration does  permit a country to seize the opportunities 
presented by a favourable external environment, notably the importation of new 
technology, the more efficient allocation of productive resources, and the reduced cost of 
capital. However, there are substantial risks in engaging with the global economy for 
individual countries. It increases their vulnerability to external shocks which have 
become increasingly frequent since the liberalisation of trade and capital flows. Only 
countries which can afford to keep substantial foreign exchange reserves or have access 
to large bail-out packages in the event of a financial crisis or attack on their currency 
have been able to successfully confront the risks of globalisation. The long-run benefits 
of  increased integration are conspicuously evident through their  impact on domestic 
growth and living standards. Over the last decade per-capita growth in the quartile of 
fastest integrating developing countries was over 3 percentage points more than in the 
quartile with the lowest pace of integration. 
The degree of globalisation of industry depends more on the characteristics of 
individual industries than on each country’s specialisation. The most globalise 
manufacturing industries are high- and medium-high-technology: computers, 
scientific instruments, pharmaceuticals, electronics, basic chemicals, electrical 
machinery and motor vehicles. The only high-technology industry not to be very 
globalise is the aircraft industry, which is export-oriented but not extensively directly 
established in foreign countries. Among the low-technology industries, the most 
globalise is textiles and clothing. 
 
III. THE ASIAN GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
The growth performance of the Asian region during the last two decades has 
been among the strongest in the world economies. Both the East Asian and South 
Asian sub-regions, which account for the bulk of the population and income of the 
continent, had high growth rates during the two decades. The growth of East Asia  
region was stronger, with some countries, such as China and Korea recording 
double-digit annual growth rates of GDP in some years. China’s average growth rate 
for the entire period between 1980–1997 was above 10 percent while that of Korea 
was 9.5 percent during 1980–90 but decelerated to 7.2 percent during the 1990–97. 
The South-Asian region also recorded a high growth rate of 5.7 percent 
between 1980 to1997 (See Table 1).  However,  the disparity between the two sub-
regions in per capita income growth was wider because of the higher rate of 
population growth in South-Asia. There were also marked differences between the 
growth of the two sub-regions, as reflected in the differential rates of growth of 
industry, export of goods and services and gross domestic investment. A major 
reason for the more vigorous growth of East Asia compared to that of South Asiawas 
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Table 1  
Growth of Selected Asian Economies, 1980-97 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
Industry Value-
added 
Exports of Goods 
and Services 
Economy 1980–90 1990–97 1980–90 1990–97 1980–90 1990-97
Gross Domestic 
Investment 
1990-97 
Bangladesh 4.3 4.5 4.9 6.8 7.7 15.7 13.4 
India 5.8 5.9 7.1 7.1 5.9 13.7 8.9 
Nepal 4.6 5.0 6.0 7.7 5.6 24.1 5.2 
Pakistan 6.3 4.4 7.3 5.5 8.1 4.4 3.8 
Sri Lanka 4.2 4.9 4.6 6.5 6.8 8.4 6.4 
Indonesia 6.1 7.5 6.9 10.2 2.9 9.2 10.2 
Korea Rep 9.5 7.2 12.1 7.5 12.0 15.7 6.3 
Malaysia 5.2 8.7 7.2 11.2 10.9 14.0 16.1 
Philippines 1.0 3.3 -0.9 3.7 3.5 11.5 5.8 
Singapore 6.6 8.5 5.4 9.1 10.8 13.3 9.8 
Thailand 7.6 7.5 9.9 10.3 14.0 12.8 10.3 
China 10.2 11.9 11.1 16.3 11.5 16.8 14.1 
East Asia & Pacific 7.8 9.9 8.9 14.5 8.8 12.7  
Latin America 1.8 3.3 1.5 2.8 5.3 7.3 5.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 2.1 1.1 1.4 2.2 4.7 7.2 
South Asia 5.7 5.7 6.9 6.9 6.4 12.4 8.6 
Source: World Development Report, 1998. 
 
its closer integration with the world economy, its higher rates of domestic savings 
and investment and its generally more impressive human development record than 
South Asia (with the significant exception of Sri Lanka).  Even the growth of South 
Asia was significantly higher than those of other developing regions, such as Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa, whose performance in the 1980s was dismal. 
Although the growth rates in Latin America have recovered in the 1990s, those of 
Sub-Saharan Africa still remain depressed at a little above 2 percent per annum.  
The growth strategies of different Asian developing countries before the 
current globalisation era were predicated largely, on their resource endowments. 
Thus for example, the larger South Asian countries and China, endowed with a large 
population and a nascent industrial base, found it convenient to enlarge their 
domestic industrial sector mainly through import-substitution and catering for 
domestic demand. These larger countries did not confine themselves to import-
substitution in light labour-intensive manufactures, in which they could have become 
more efficient over time through learning by doing or through reaping the economies 
of scale with expanding domestic and external markets. Instead, they chose to extend 
import-substitution to intermediate and capital goods industries as well. This 
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approach proved costly as the inefficiencies in the intermediate and capital goods 
industries were passed on to the consumer goods industry. On the other hand, 
countries with relatively small size and low product diversity found it expedient to 
produce mainly for the export markets. 
The choice of secondary import-substitution by larger developing countries 
was influenced by balance of payments considerations, as well as by the motivation 
to  acquire a comprehensive technological capability. The desire for rapid 
industrialisation and avoidance of the balance of payments constraint lay behind the 
adoption of the Mahalanobis-Feldman model, which assigned primary importance to 
the development of heavy industries. Other South Asian countries, such as Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka, facing similar balance of payments problems, did not follow the 
Mahalaonobian strategy to the letter, but still carried out extensive import 
substitution . These policies gave rise to a highly capital intensive, inefficient and 
technologically backward industrial structure and caused the agriculture sector to 
stagnate as a result of  resource mobilisation policies of turning, very sharply on 
some occasions, the terms of trade against agriculture. Notwithstanding these 
weaknesses the South Asian countries, especially India, succeeded in building  a 
sizeable industrial base.  
In contrast, the development strategy pursued by the East Asian economies 
adopted more pragmatic policies towards the industrial sector (as well as a more 
supportive approach towards the agriculture sector). While state intervention in these 
countries was widespread, as in South Asia, it differed in being strategic, rather than 
pervasive. It was also more developmental and facilitatory and less preventive and  
interdictive. The typical East Asian state was a facilitator and promoter of the 
activities of the private sector and tried to “crowd in” rather than “crowd out” private 
investment. The state, unlike the private firm, was seen as capable of taking a long-
term view and hence able to identify and promote “industries where income elasticity 
of demand is high, technological progress is rapid, and labour productivity rises fast” 
[Ojimi (1970)]. The East Asian governments have also paid relatively greater 
attention to the provision of physical and social infrastructure. Though the East and 
Southeast Asian economies have higher per capita expenditures vis a vis the South 
Asian economies, the differences in the proportion of GDP/public expenditure 
devoted to physical and social infrastructure in the two groups of economies is also 
striking (See Table 2).  
Furthermore, there is a difference in the strategy adopted by East Asian 
countries in respect of social services and poverty alleviation. While the East Asian 
countries have tried to approach the problem in a more generalised manner, i.e., by 
expanding employment opportunities and by pursuing effective policies of human 
resource development, especially education and housing, the South Asian countries 
have  adopted  the more direct approach of subsidising food and social services, often  
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Table 2 
Social and Physical Infrastructure: Selected Indicators 
Public Expenditure  
  as a  % of GNP  
Public Expenditure 
as a  % of GNP 
on Education 
Education as a  % 
of Total Public 
Expenditure 
Electricity 
Consumption 
per Capita (kwh) 
  on Health 1960 1988-90 1960 1988-90 1988-90 1988 
Early NIEs       
Hong Kong n/a 3.5 n/a 2.7 15.9 4222 
Republic of Korea 0.2 6.4 2.0 3.7 22.4 2035 
Singapore 1.0 2.9 2.8 3.4 11.5 4821 
Taiwan Province of China n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Later NIEs       
Indonesia 0.3 2.5 2.5 0.9 4.3 211 
Malaysia 1.1 1.6 2.9 5.5 18.3 1141 
Thailand 0.4 5.6 2.3 3.8 20.0 627 
South Asia       
Bangladesh n/a 0.9 0.6 2.2 10.5 64 
India 0.5 3.2 2.3 3.2 8.5 299 
Nepal 0.2 0.7 0.4 2.9 10.8 36 
Pakistan 0.3 4.5 1.1 3.4 5.0 351 
Sri Lanka 2.0 2.3 3.8 2.7 8.1 169 
Source:  Human Development Report 1993, pp. 158-159 and 164-165; and UN ESCAP, Economic and 
Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 1990, pp. 133 and 150. 
 
mainly in the urban areas. The generally poor record of social indicators in South 
Asia is also attributable to the political economy of public expenditure allocations 
which is largely biased in favour of the elite and urban middle classes rather than 
being targeted towards the poor. Thus while primary education was starved of funds, 
public investments were lavished on higher education, with stress paid more on the 
number of graduates produced rather than on the quality of education imparted. 
A major adverse consequence of this neglect of human resource development 
is the deferment of a demographic transition, resulting in high rates of population 
growth and the translation of modest economic growth performance into poor growth 
in per capita income [Lucas (1993)]. The human development indicators of South 
Asian countries, with the exception of Sri Lanka and parts of India, such as Kerala, 
compare very poorly with those of East Asian countries. Some of these differences 
are in the nature of differences in initial conditions in that human resource 
development especially literacy and education have always been high in the East 
Asian countries than in others. However, the differentials in  human resource 
development have also been the consequence of policy interventions in East Asia 
and, mutatis mutandis for lack of such intervention in South Asia. 
For many years East/South-East Asian countries received universal kudos for 
being  the fastest growing economies in the world. Their remarkable achievement in 
Globalisation and Asian Economic Growth  
 
37:4, 643 
sustaining a high rate of economic growth over a long period was significantly 
fostered by their active participation in the globalisation process. This enabled them 
to take advantage of the increasing opportunities for using trade as an engine of 
growth and for accessing external capital and technology. However, enhanced 
participation in the globalisation process brings with it certain risks. These risks 
include frequent changes in the rules of the game which often impinge adversely on 
the autonomy of national governments to frame policies best suited to their country’s 
circumstances. Fortunately, for these countries these rules, in the framing of which 
developed countries have a much larger say, were not too intrusive during their 
period of high growth.  
In the 1990s, however, the worldwide liberalisation of trade and capital flows 
has considerably limited the room for independent national policies for development 
and are being increasingly forced to pursue policies  cast in a standardised mould. As 
a result, not only many of these countries themselves have become victims of the 
risks of globalisation, their appeal as role-models for development has begun to lose 
its lustre. For many developing countries, the dream of becoming the next Asian tiger 
has now been replaced by the nightmare about becoming the next victim of a virulent 
strain of  Asian flu. 
The current  East Asian crisis, which was triggered by the massive devaluation 
of Thai Baht in July 1997,  differs from several previous currency crises in a number 
of fundamental respects [Krugman (1997)]. Since most early warning mechanisms 
were focussed on features which had been observed in past crises they failed to pick 
this one up. The key feature in this regard is the fact that the crisis was a private 
sector, not a public sector problem and that there was no significant public deficit or 
debt build-up in these cases. Further, the key private sector variable was investment 
growth, not consumption growth, so that widening current account surpluses were 
not seen as problematic. 
 
IV. TECHNOLOGY AND ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES 
Growth and technological change have been a major preoccupation of 
economics since the days of classical economists such as Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and Karl Marx. Since the late 1950s a large body of research undertaken by 
economists has tried to unfathom the complex relationship between economic growth 
and technical change. Empirical results by Solow (1957), not only confirmed the 
hypothesis of earlier economists that technical change implied a shift in the 
production function, rather than a movement  along it, but also produced the 
landmark result that more than 80 percent of growth in labour productivity was 
owing to technical change, rather than growth in factor supplies. Since then 
considerable effort has gone into developing the concept of technical change within 
S. M. Naseem 
 
37:4, 644 
the production function framework and into modifying the treatment of technical 
change as endogenous (or embodied in factor inputs) rather than exogenous (or 
disembodied) factor. 
 
Hardware vs. Software 
In the past, technology was seen largely as being embedded in physical capital 
consisting of physical infrastructure and machines, equipment and structures in 
production plants and service providing organisations. These constituted the  
“hardware” of economic growth because, once in place, the technology implicit in 
the machines and other fixed structures rigidly determined particular patterns of 
activity, which cannot be changed without physically replacing the machines or 
structures. In recent years, however, the pendulum has been swinging away from 
“hardware” towards “software” issues of technology development, such as human 
and institutional development. 
The role of human capital as a carrier of technology complementary to that 
embodied in physical capital, is now widely accepted. Lucas (1993), [Amsden 
(1989)] a Nobel laureate succinctly records the dethronement of physical capital  
accumulation by human capital as follows: “The main engine of growth is the 
accumulation of human capital—of knowledge—and the main source of differences 
in living standards among nations is differences in human capital. Physical 
accumulation plays an essential but decidedly subsidiary role. Human capital 
accumulation takes place in schools, in research organisations, and in the course of 
producing goods and engaging in trade. Little is known about the relative importance 
of these different modes of accumulation, but for understanding periods of very rapid 
growth in a single economy, learning on the job seems to be by far the most central”. 
The importance of human capital has in recent years  been emphasised in 
the Human Development Reports issued by the United Nations since the early 
1990s, under the direction of the late Mahbubul Haq, who had originally agreed to 
address this Conference. The award of the Nobel prize this year to Professor 
Amartya Sen is also partly in recognition of the importance of human 
development, especially education, on which much of his more recent research has 
been focused. This year’s World Development Report by the World Bank as well 
is  devoted to Knowledge and Development. However, there are considerable 
disparities in both “hardware” and “software” of technology across Asian 
countries as shown in Table 3. 
 
V.  PATTERNS OF TECHNOLOGY: DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA 
The technological paradigm relevant for the East Asian economy is that of a 
“late industrialising” economies.  Both  the first industrial revolution in  Great Britain  
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which was largely driven by a series of technological changes,  and the second 
industrial revolution in continental Europe and the United States a century later, were 
based on a new wave of innovation  and in the case of the latter, the exploitation of 
the economies of scale.  However, the defining feature of late industrialisers in the 
second half of the twentieth century has been not only borrowed technology but 
learning-by-doing.  The received theory for the success of East Asian economies has 
been the existence of lower wages in them that upset higher productivity in the more 
developed countries but this has been shown to be insufficient to explain the success 
of East Asian countries in the export of manufactures to the developed world.  The 
underlying superiority of these countries consisted more in the better organised 
production facilities, superior infrastructure, production and equipment.  As shown 
by Amsden (1991), in East Asia subsidies were given to industries “according to the 
principle of reciprocity, in exchange for concrete performance standards with respect 
to output exports and eventually, R and D. Late industrialisations requires a high 
degree of discipline of labour but what distinguished East Asia was not just 
discipline of labour but also its ability to channelise capital into priority  areas of 
production.  In all successful late industrialising countries the strategic focus of the 
firm centres on the shop floor as that is where borrowed technology is made to work.  
The success in the shop floor has been largely due to such institutional factors as 
relatively narrow earnings gap between managers and workers, high levels 
educational of the workforce and a high share of performance based bonuses in 
earnings.  The business enterprises in East Asia are generally widely diversified and 
have defused “best practice management techniques” to a number of industries.   
The role of the state in East Asian economies has varied during its industrial 
transition from import substitution to export promotion and high technology phases 
of development. Typically the role of the state has been strongest during the import 
substitution phase while the private sector has played an increasing role in the latter 
phases of development [Rhee (1988)].  
More detailed descriptions of the technological progress of East Asia are 
catalogued in Hobday (1995), who discusses in detail the institutional framework and 
business alliances through which the step-wise climb up the technology ladder was 
realised in these countries, especially in the area of electronics. However, Hobday is 
prescient enough to point out that their  strength lies in “low-cost, high-quality 
production engineering, rather than software or R and D” and that they are 
“conspicuously weak compared with Japan and other OECD economies”. 
Hobday’s book carefully documents the “painstaking and cumulative process 
of technological learning” through which firms operating in East Asia rose up the 
technology ladder. He does not find much evidence of leapfrogging: “much 
latecomer learning took place in a field which could be described as pre-electronic: 
mechanical, electro-mechanical and precision engineering activities, for example. 
Competencies tended to build upon each other incrementally, leading to advanced 
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engineering and software.” Hobday’s account of technical progress in East Asia  
through extended learning by firms is also supported by  generalised accounts of the 
process of technological capability acquisition [Lall (1997) and Nelson and Pack 
(1998)]. The crucial task is that of building up various human and organisational 
skills in the industrial workforce.  
Nelson pays particular attention to the case of Taiwan and Korea and  points 
out  that though there are differences in the particular strategies adopted, some strong 
similarities show up between these countries. First, they both have broad and deep 
industrial structures unlike most other developing countries. Second, the industrial 
drive was partly a spin off from the effort  to develop military capability. Third, the 
strong emphasis on education was crucial in providing the educated workforce 
necessary to support the transition to products of increasing technological 
complexity. 
If the essence of economically significant human capital is the mastery of 
technology, then the latter is mainly a learned skill [Nelson (1997)]. Young and 
Krugman appear to assume that the technology embodied in imported capital goods 
merely resides in the machines and has little effect on production workers, the 
company or society Lall (1990) shows that this is very far from the reality.  
At a given level of technology; a firm needs to have available to it  skills and 
knowledge up to one or two steps below that of the target technology for it to be 
successfully undertaken, even if the associated capital equipment is imported. In 
learning to operate particular machines at internationally competitive levels of 
productivity, workers and firms raise themselves to commensurate levels of 
technological mastery. That is how human capital is built up. The above point is a 
consequence of the key role of learning under competitive pressure, or step-wise 
upgrading of skills and knowledge in building technological capability. Obviously 
the more complex the technology, the more time, effort and investment needed to 
indigenise the it. 
Complementary organisational changes and business management practices 
also contribute significantly to aggregate productivity. The level of organisation and 
management is also, in a broad sense, a part of the technology of production and 
identified as a part of the “software” of economic growth. Lall (1997) shows that a 
large part of the building up of technological capability in a nation occurs within 
firms through organisational learning. The recent Asian financial crisis partly reflects 
the lack of balance  between the soft and hard components of technology 
development. 
In contrast to East Asian countries, South Asian countries have given more 
emphasis on scientific research than on technological accomplishment, with the 
possible exception, in case of India and Pakistan, in the nuclear field, which is 
motivated in order to achieve military rather than industrial or economic objectives.  
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Thus while both countries, especially India,  have produced high calibre scientists 
and even Nobel laureates, they have not succeeded in  significantly improving the 
educational and skill levels of their labour force. Their educational system has 
remained elitist and has generally excluded the poor who form a higher proportion of 
the population than in East Asia.  
In recent years, however, India has demonstrated a clear and growing 
capacity in service-sector exports based on information technology (IT) is now 
well-recognised. The Global Competitiveness Report of 1998 confirmed the high 
international opinion of India’s engineering and scientific capacities, the products 
in part of India’s long-term investments in the Indian Institute of Technology 
(IIT). India’s prowess has been most evident in the software sector, where world-
class programmers operate in technology centres such as Bangalore, Delhi, 
Mumbai, and Chennai. Operating through satellite links, Indian programmers are 
providing IT support to U.S. and European firms in areas ranging from software 
development and maintenance, back-office operations, data transcription and 
transmission, telemarketing, and other related areas. Software exports have been 
growing around 50 percent per year in recent years, reaching an estimated $1.75 
billion in fiscal 1997-98, or roughly 5 percent of merchandise exports, a 
proportion that is likely to rise significantly in the years ahead (by some estimates 
to around 10 percent in the year 2000). Around 10 percent of Microsoft’s 
worldwide programmer workforce is Indian. 
Here, as in labour-intensive exports, Indian government policy could do much 
more to spur export growth. On the plus side has been the government’s long-term 
commitment to the IIT. More recently has been the government’s support for 
Software Technology Parks (STPs), in Bangalore, Pune, and other cities, which are 
the IT-industry equivalent of the EPZs in manufacturing industries [Bajpai and Sachs 
(n.d.)].  
There are serious downsides, however. The continuing state monopoly in 
international telephony as well as in internet provision within the Indian market 
seriously raise the costs of telephone and IT services in India, and will do 
considerable damage in India’s international competitiveness in the IT sector 
unless rectified. India’s telephone density is abysmally low (See Table), at 
around 1.3 per hundred in 1995, compared with around 62.6 per hundred in the 
United States. Physical infrastructure for data transmission within India (e.g. 
fibre optic cables) remain underdeveloped despite some recent progress. 
Restrictive policies on FDI have kept international chip makers out of India, and 
have indirectly raised the prices of PCs in the Indian market. With a more 
liberalised and competitive environment, however,  India’s strengths in IT is 
likely to become an important bulwark of export growth. 
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V.  GLOBALISATION: A NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
PARADIGM 
There is broad consensus that trade and broader economic integration with the 
outside world significantly influence the upgrading of technologies in less developed 
countries. Does globalisation lead to technological upgrading in developing countries 
or does it result in a dependency relationship forcing them to specialise in low skill 
products with a poor technological content? This is a major issue which has been 
debated by development economists in recent years, especially in the context of 
export-led growth of East Asian economies. The question is discussed in somewhat 
greater detail in the next section.  
There  has been a major qualitative change in the paradigm affecting the 
transfer of technology. In the past, technology transfers were based on such products 
as steel, motor vehicles, and heavy machinery—items for which sizeable proportions 
of production costs reflected the value of raw materials and the sheer manual labour 
required to manipulate them. 
Since then, trends toward conceptualisation have focused today’s views of 
economic advancement increasingly on downsized, smaller, less “concrete” evidence 
of output, requiring more technologically sophisticated labour input. 
The process of conceptualisation in output seems to have accelerated in recent 
decades with the advent of inventions such as the semiconductor, the microprocessor, 
the computer, and the satellite. There are two strings of transmission between trade 
and diffusion of technologies [Navaretti et al. (1998)]. The first one depends on the 
pattern of specialisation of the country in question. Learning is faster if the country 
specialises in goods with higher learning potential, both in terms of learning by doing 
or deliberate learning investments. Goods with higher learning potential are generally 
more technologically sophisticated goods, as measured by production technology, 
product quality or product varieties. Thus, trade will induce technological upgrading 
if opening up countries face a higher incentive to specialise in high tech products 
than in autarky. 
However, technological upgrading is not just based on domestic resources. 
The second string of transmission is linked to the new potential sources of 
technological inputs opening up under free trade. Some of these technological inputs 
can be deliberately purchased (new machines, foreign investments, skilled personnel) 
and others are acquired through spillovers, by trading with more technologically 
advanced partners, by gathering information in foreign markets, by learning from 
sophisticated imported goods. Of course, these two strings are intertwined, in that the 
easier and the cheaper the imported technology the more likely are countries to 
specialise in high tech products. 
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Trade affects the choice of the investment in learning (investment in schooling 
or specialisation in products with high learning potential) but the learning process 
takes place at home, without using foreign inputs. Interaction between countries 
provides great opportunities for learning. Trade is an obvious channel. It is possible 
to import new varieties of inputs and all types of foreign technologies. There is more 
exchange of information. It is possible to learn how imported products are made with 
reverse engineering. Foreign investments open up similar channels for learning. If 
they are complementary to trade, as in the case of  vertical investments, both trade 
and investment  will interact to produce a  virtuous nexus to reinforce the learning 
process. Economic integration generates learning processes, which are partly 
intentional and accounted for by the market and are partly unintentional spillovers or 
external economies.2 
Leading multinationals construct international production networks (IPN), as 
they need quick access to lower-cost external capabilities that are complementary to 
their own competencies. In general multinationals are found to have positive 
spillovers on productivity of local firms, although the magnitude of spillovers is 
positively affected by the absorptive capacity of local firms. Equally, FDI are found 
to enhance the export performance of host country firms, by providing access to 
foreign markets, and helping them in the marketing distribution and servicing of their 
products in the international market. 
 
VI.  IS TECHNOLOGY THE CULPRIT? 
A variety of  explanations have been advanced so far for the sudden 
change of fortunes in the East Asian economies during the last year and a half3 
[Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Taylor (1998)]. Most of them concentrate on the 
financial structure and macromanagement issues. However, this section  will 
concentrate on supply side issues which are more closely linked to the question 
of technological development and its role in the growth process. One of the 
earliest critiques of East and Southeast Asian growth—indeed at a time when the 
euphoria about East Asian growth was at its highest and when  few had any 
inkling of the 1997 crisis—centred on the  productivity growth record and the  
“excessive” use of capital in these economies. 
Krugman (1994), quoting the work of Young (1995) and Kim and Lau (1994), 
likened their capital intensive growth to that of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that 
“if growth in East Asia has been primarily investment driven” then it was likely that 
“capital piling up there is beginning to yield diminishing returns”.  
2Blomstrom and Kokko (1996), surveys the research on the role of foreign investments and the  
link between imported technological inputs and performance at the micro level. 
3For a comprehensive review, [see, Corbett and Vines (1998)]. 
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Krugman’s article has spawned a lively controversy about the underlying 
factors of growth in the East Asian economies centring around the debate of total 
factor productivity, a measure which shows how efficiently factors of production are 
combined to produce output.4 The measure suffers from many serious conceptual and 
empirical problems and has not aroused universal acceptability among economists. 
Krugman’s critique of East Asian growth also raises the question whether high 
growth rates based primarily on high rates of capital accumulation (East Asian 
economies save from a third to two-thirds of their GDP) is sustainable in the long-run 
and whether these countries have should pay more attention to the state of art 
technology available to them rather than devote resources to the development of new 
technologies. In short, Krugman and others see the Asian miracle as being  based on 
“perspiration” rather than “inspiration”. Krugman conjectured that growth was bound 
to slow down soon as Western levels of capital intensity are approached . The recent 
financial turmoil and its repercussions on growth in Asia can be seen as a 
confirmation of Krugman’s hunch. 
Appendix Table 4 compares estimates of TFP growth in different studies of 
Asian growth. Most are consistent with the view that the contribution of capital 
growth has been significantly greater than TFP contribution although the pattern is 
more striking in some countries and time periods than others. 
The core of the TFP debate centres around the interpretation of the rapid 
increases in capital per worker which took place. In neo-classical theory capital 
intensification is regarded  as an automatic and effortless shift along a well known 
global production function. In contrast, “revisionists” stress the effort which is 
necessary to master technologies that might not be new to the world, but are 
unknown to the countries introducing them. Viewed this way, capital intensification 
is not a simple movement along a prevailing production function, but a search for an 
enlargement of the set of production possibilities. Successful absorption of new 
technologies, and investigation of new products and new markets requires a growing 
group of skilled workers and entrepreneurs who learn about and learn to master new 
technologies already in use in more advanced countries. 
It is still an open empirical question whether productivity growth, and returns 
to capital, have been low for some time, or have been high but falling. Krugman cited 
the evidence of capital outflow from the region as evidence that returns have been 
low (and would presumably claim capital inflow since the mid-1990s as evidence of 
a bubble). Radelet and Sachs (1998) cite OECD data that the “rate of return on 
capital in Korea declined gradually from around 22 percent in the mid 1980s to about 
14 percent in 1994. 
In Singapore, a comparable indicator—the rates of return on US foreign direct 
investment—fell from 27 percent in the late 1980s to 19 percent in the mid-1990s. In 
4For a critical review, [see, Chen  (1997)]. 
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Hong Kong and Taipei, China rates of return fell from around 21 percent to 15 
percent. While these declines do confirm the neoclassical prediction of declining 
returns to investment, and are consistent with the rapid accumulation of capital 
documented by Young…the important point is that they are still well above the 
worldwide average returns on US foreign direct investment of 11 percent.” 
In the context of the present crisis Krugman describes the problem as one of a 
short term boom “papering over the cracks” of fundamental problems in Asia. 
However, the puzzle is  that despite low and falling rates of return to investment, 
implied by the TFP data, capital flowed in to the region and domestic investment 
continued at high rates of growth for more than two decades, which can hardly be 
called a “bubble”. When the boom subsequently broke the fundamental fissures open 
up. Radelet and Sachs dispute this notion. 
In discussions on East Asian growth, Young and Krugman, alongwith many 
others, tend to  focus more on TFP than on average labour productivity, where the 
East Asian record is indisputably strong. The two measures need to  be treated in 
conjunction with each other as complementary indicators of a country’s economic 
progress. Aggregate labour productivity and its growth are the most useful measures 
of the level and changes in economic welfare. Total factor productivity (TFP) is a 
measure of economic efficiency, based on how well inputs are used to generate 
output. The two can not be separated in discussions of a country’s economic success 
or failure. If both move in the same direction, there is little cause for concern, except 
about the speed of the change. But even if the TFP does not rise and  average 
productivity does, there should be some cause for satisfaction, though not for 
complacency. 
The idea of very low technical progress in East Asia conveyed by the TFP 
data also  defies both commonsense and manifest reality. As Professor Stiglitz (n.d.) 
notes, “Any visitor to the cities and factories in East Asia comes away impressed by 
the enormous technological progress in the last decades. The Young, Kim, Lau et al. 
results do not seem to be  very robust. When a country is accumulating capital 
rapidly, small changes in the estimate of the capital share can result in a large shift in 
estimates of the contribution of total factor productivity.” 
Besides casual empiricism, there is considerable evidence that Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, have achieved considerable technological progress in a 
number of specialised  areas or production niches. Among the most notable and 
widely known are consumer electronics, computers and integrated circuits (ICs), 
automotive products, automation in manufacturing, telecommunications, aerospace 
and military, medical electronics, power and energy and transportation. By 1991, 
they had shifted well beyond the mere assembly of components to some high value 
added, high technology manufactures as well. 
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A recent study by Timmer (1998) provides  a revealing  comparison of 
manufacturing productivity levels in China, India, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Taiwan with the US as the reference country for the period 1963–1993. According to 
the study, South Korea and Taiwan showed prolonged “catching  up” in labour 
productivity with the US, whereas the other countries had long periods of relative 
stagnation. This is reflected in relative performance of seven detailed manufacturing 
branches. Physical capital per hour worked in the Asian countries is still well below 
the US level and there are abundant opportunities for further capital intensification. 
Relative total factor productivity levels in South-Korean and Taiwanese 
manufacturing are much lower than in the US in all manufacturing branches. The 
same is true for India and Indonesia compared to South Korea and Taiwan. Hence, 
the author concludes, “ late industrialisers do not automatically benefit from the 
increasing global pool of technologies”. The study also shows that TFP results at the 
aggregate level, on which Krugman places primary reliance,  could be substantially 
different from those at the disaggregated industry level. 
While the performance East-Asian countries in the technological field is not as 
unsanguine as depicted by Krugman and other protagonists of low total factor 
productivity thesis, there do seem to be serious weaknesses in the technological base 
and the institutional structure of East Asian countries which could adversely affect 
their long-run development as well as their recovery from the present crisis. Some of 
these weaknesses are revealed in a study [Ernst (1998)] of Korea and Taiwan, the 
leading late industrialisers of East Asia.  In particular, the study focuses on Korean 
electronic industry which was the leading sector in the high rates growth of Korean 
exports. Ernst identifies three major limitations to catching up process in the Korean 
electronics industry. These are; (a) a narrow domestic knowledge base; (b) a narrow 
and a sticky product specialisation; and (c) a high imports dependence. These 
limitations have become more serious in the face of the financial crisis that hit Korea 
and other East-Asian countries towards the end of 1997.  
An OECD review in 1995 concluded “the country can no longer afford simply to 
import technology—the foreigners are more and more reticent to introduce on 
concessional terms—and will have to raise the value-added and technological intensity of 
what it produces [OECD (1995)]. Since then the additional constraint of a shortage of 
foreign exchange has made it even more imperative for Korea to broaden its knowledge 
base which, in turn, has been limited by such factors as the lack of a critical mass of R 
and D, inefficiency in corporate technology management and public innovation system.  
In the past, Korean electronic firms had little motivation to invest in R and D. 
However, with the emergence of other competitors with lower labour costs, Korean 
electronics industry lost its comparative advantage in low technology products and 
the need for increased R and D expenditures became apparent in order to move to 
higher value-added products where imported technology is either too expensive or  
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not easily available. Although Korea’s private R and D spending as a ratio of total 
sale increased from  0.36 percent in 1976 to 2.5 percent in 1995 which is less than 
half of the current R and D/trade ratios of US and Japanese manufacturing 
companies.  Korea’s per capita R and D expenditures of $176.2 (in 1993) lagged well 
behind those of Japan ($762.9 in 1992) and the US ($540.9). The extremely tight 
budgetary constraints imposed by the IMF bail-out package for Korea implies that R 
and D expenditure will be curtailed rather than increased.   
Korea also lagged behind in patent registrations major OECD countries in 
patent registration. The problem in Korea is not only with the low level of R and D 
expenditures but poor management of technology development. Thus, while Korea 
spent more than twice the amount for R and D compared to Taiwan, the number of 
patents granted to Koreans by the US in 1992 was only 538 or less than half 
compared to 1252 patents granted to Taiwanese.   
The private sector now spends more than 80 percent of Korea’s total R and D 
expenditures. However, private R and D has a very narrow focus.  Most of it is geared to 
development rather than research, specially process re-engineering and product 
customisation.  The main problem with the R and D sector in Korea is a mismatch in the 
allocation of funds and equipment.  While nearly 80 percent of the Government civilian 
R and D funds go to government research institutes (GRIs)—a much higher proportion 
than given to such institutes in France and Japan, the two countries where the 
government traditionally has played a strong role in the national innovation system, 
Korean universities which employed  76 percent of Ph.D holders receive less than 11 
percent of government civilian R and D funds.  Further weakness  of the Korean 
innovation system, paradoxically enough relates with  established educational system. 
While in the past the system’s heavy focus on training mid-level managers, engineers and 
technicians served it well, the present needs for research product design and market 
development in a competitive world are not adequately fulfilled by it.  Korea faces a 
crisis in its higher education as its reliance on the formal education system with heavy 
emphasis on conformity, memorisation and lack of creativity has made it anchronous. 
Korea’s semi-conductor industry also suffers from a very narrow product 
range and a high dependence on imports. While it exports more than 90 percent of its 
total semi-conductor output, it imports more than 87 percent of its domestic demand 
for other semi-conductor products. Such an extreme imbalance between supply and 
demand makes its very difficult to broaden and deepen the forward and backward 
linkages within the electronic industry and the economy generally. Indeed, Korea’s 
semi-conductor industry can be treated as a modern version of the classical mono 
product primary export enclave, with minimal linkages with the domestic economy.5  
 
5Korea needs to import 70 percent of its total inputs for semiconductors production (40 percent 
from Japan and 20 percent from the United States). As for the production equipment, 90 percent have to 
be imported, with 50 percent originating from Japan. 
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As a result of its inability to upgrade its technology through R and D and move into 
more sophisticated products, Korea has undergone a perverse change in the 
destination of its electronic exports away from the demanding American and 
European markets and towards an increasing reliance on emerging market countries 
of East Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Russia. 
The high import dependence of the Korean economy, which arises largely 
from the high import-intensity of its electronics industry,  constitutes a fundamental 
barrier to sustained industrialisation. Korea’s electronics industry heavily depends on 
imports of key components, subassemblies and production equipment.  As long as 
this structure is preserved, trade deficits will continue to expand and exchange rates 
will come under downward pressure, even if economic growth rates rise. This has 
been an important element underlying Korea’s high vulnerability to the crisis of 
international capital and currency markets. 
It is also significant to note that Taiwan, which has been less severely 
affected by the Asian ‘contagion’ than Korea, often regarded as its twin, partly 
because it followed a different pattern of technological specialisation and 
industrial organisation.6 While in Korea, the dominant form of industrial 
enterprises, the chaebols, have typically used octopus-like unrelated 
diversification as a short-cut to rapid market share expansion, the small and 
medium enterprises, the modal form of industrial enterprise in Taiwan, have 
concentrated on deepening their involvement in a particular sector or group of 
related products. Their  without much concern for the depth of the production 
system that can be generated by such shallow forms of diversification. As a 
result, the Korean companies were unable to accumulate systematically a broad 
range of technological capabilities for a given set of products. It also has also left 
very little scope for an upgrading into higher-end market niches where premium 
prices could be reaped. Finally, this opportunistic form of unrelated 
diversification has precluded a shift to technology diversification. 
 
VII.  LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The robust  development of the Asian economies in the past two decades has 
been seriously marred by the self-doubt created in the region by the  Asian financial 
crises of the past year and a half about the future prospects of the region. It has  
forced us to reconsider the perceptions about  how technology affects economic 
growth and how both are shaped by globalisation. Among the important lessons that 
emerge from the experience of successful countries in the region are: 
6There were also other differences between the initial conditions and policies of the two 
countries, especially the fact that Taiwan had  much higher foreign exchange reserves ($86 billion) and a 
much lower foreign debt (only $100 million) at the time of the crisis than Korea ($17 billion and $230 
billion, respectively). For these and other details, see Ranis, Miracles that do not cease, Financial Times, 
19 February, 1998.  
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 (i) Technological specialisation determines export success: the more a country 
focuses on higher-end, R and D-intensive products, the more it is expected 
to experience sustainable export growth and increasing export revenues. 
 (ii) Catching-up requires an active state and a set of institutions, incentives and 
policies that can mobilise the necessary resources, and 
 (iii) Accumulation of capital matters, but it needs to be complemented with the 
capacity to learn, to assimilate and to innovate. 
 (iv) In any event, technological progress is not reversible. We must learn to live 
with it. The search for Swadeshi, Islamic or otherwise culturally kosher 
technologies will lead us to nowhere in this globalise world. It is of course 
quite legitimate to use technologies within the cultural, social and other 
desirable parameters of a country. 
Globalisation has also underlined the need for developing new technological 
paradigms which will enable a country to move up the technology ladder and 
constantly watch out against being trapped in a dead-end. Technological upgrading 
has to be a continuous process undertaken along with the restructuring of the 
economy in the wider sense. Mere adoption of new technologies which may yield 
high payoffs in terms of output and exports will not serve the purpose. In the context 
of the current East Asian crisis, the region now faces a fundamental dilemma: the 
crisis has dramatically increased the need for industrial upgrading, while at the same 
time reducing its chances of success as the urgent need is the revival of the economy 
rather than long-term restructuring. 
East Asia’s success in recent decades had been conditioned by partial 
restructuring of the economy epitomised by the “flying geese” model, envisages a 
continuous shifting of comparative advantage from developing countries at a higher 
stage of development to those at a lower stage [UN-ESCAP (1990)]. This is achieved 
by an increasing complementarity as the former vacate their niches in the production 
and export of relatively less sophisticated industries to the less developed Asian 
nations. However, this model no longer works as effectively as it did  in the past, if 
only because the leading goose, Japan, has become a dead duck [Bergsten (1997)]. 
At a broader level, a radical paradigm shift is needed, as East Asia has reached 
the limits of the old export-led industrialisation model with its emphasis on 
standardised mass production. Moving beyond these limits will require a number of 
fundamental changes in the development model. Of critical importance is the creation 
of a broad-based and diversified knowledge base for technology diversification, 
especially with regard to product design, market development, the production of key 
components and the provision of high-end knowledge intensive support services. 
Strengthening the financial and technological capabilities of domestic small- and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) is a second element of such a paradigm shift.  
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Innovative SMEs are an essential prerequisite for flexible domestic support 
industries. Thirdly, government, business and labour, there is an urgent need for 
establishing a new social consensus, with the help of all the principal actors in the 
economy, including those adversely affected by restructuring,  and for improving the 
society’s learning efficiency. 
Finally, one of the most critical issues that the Asian countries  need to 
face in the coming years is a redefinition of the link between local capability 
formation and international linkages. Globalisation has made it impossible for  
local capabilities to exist in isolation: they are rapidly becoming 
internationalised, either through acquisitions or through the increasing power of 
global customers .This requires a major shift in strategic priorities, away from, 
though not at the expense of,  an almost exclusive focus on the establishment of 
“national” institutions and linkages. However,  in the final analysis a country’s 
development, including its technological development, is “...limited by the 
growth of knowledge within it”, regardless of whether such knowledge is created 
by national or foreign institutions. 
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